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Abstract. We present a new scheme for quantum homomorphic encryp-
tion which is compact and allows for efficient evaluation of arbitrary
polynomial-sized quantum circuits. Building on the framework of Broad-
bent and Jeffery [BJ15] and recent results in the area of instantaneous
non-local quantum computation [Spe15], we show how to construct quan-
tum gadgets that allow perfect correction of the errors which occur during
the homomorphic evaluation of T gates on encrypted quantum data. Our
scheme can be based on any classical (leveled) fully homomorphic encryp-
tion (FHE) scheme and requires no computational assumptions besides
those already used by the classical scheme. The size of our quantum gad-
get depends on the space complexity of the classical decryption function
– which aligns well with the current efforts to minimize the complexity of
the decryption function.
Our scheme (or slight variants of it) offers a number of additional ad-
vantages such as ideal compactness, the ability to supply gadgets “on
demand”, circuit privacy for the evaluator against passive adversaries, and
a three-round scheme for blind delegated quantum computation which
puts only very limited demands on the quantum abilities of the client.
Keywords: Homomorphic encryption, quantum cryptography, quantum telepor-
tation, garden-hose model
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1 Introduction
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is the holy grail of modern cryptography.
Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzous were the first to observe the possibility of
manipulating encrypted data in a meaningful way, rather than just storing and
retrieving it [RAD78]. After some partial progress [GM84, Pai99, BGN05, IP07]
over the years, a breakthrough happened in 2009 when Gentry presented a fully-
homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme [Gen09]. Since then, FHE schemes have
been simplified [VDGHV10] and based on more standard assumptions [BV11].
The exciting developments around FHE have sparked a large amount of research
in other areas such as functional encryption [GKP+13a, GVW13, GKP+13b,
SW14] and obfuscation [GGH+13].
Developing quantum computers is a formidable technical challenge, so it
currently seems likely that quantum computing will not be available immediately
to everyone and hence quantum computations have to be outsourced. Given the
importance of classical4 FHE for “computing in the cloud”, it is natural to wonder
about the existence of encryption schemes which can encrypt quantum data in
such a way that a server can carry out arbitrary quantum computations on the
encrypted data (without interacting with the encrypting party5). While previous
work on quantum homomorphic encryption has mostly focused on information-
theoretic security (see Section 1.2 below for details), schemes that are based
on computational assumptions have only recently been thoroughly investigated
by Broadbent and Jeffery. In [BJ15], they give formal definitions of quantum
fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE) and its security and they propose three
schemes for quantum homomorphic encryption assuming the existence of classical
FHE.
A natural idea is to encrypt a message qubit with the quantum one-time pad
(i.e. by applying a random Pauli operation), and send the classical keys for the
quantum one-time pad along as classical information, encrypted by the classical
FHE scheme. This basic scheme is called CL in [BJ15]. It is easy to see that CL
allows an evaluator to compute arbitrary Clifford operations on encrypted qubits,
simply by performing the actual Clifford circuit, followed by homomorphically
updating the quantum one-time pad keys according to the commutation rules
between the performed Clifford gates and the Pauli encryptions. The CL scheme
can be regarded as analogous to additively homomorphic encryption schemes in
the classical setting. The challenge, like multiplication in the classical case, is to
perform non-Clifford gates such as the T gate. Broadbent and Jeffery propose
two different approaches for doing so, accomplishing homomorphic encryption
for circuits with a limited number of T gates. These results lead to the following
main open problem:
Is it possible to construct a quantum homomorphic scheme that allows
evaluation of polynomial-sized quantum circuits?
4 Here and throughout the article, we use “classical” to mean “non-quantum”.
5 In contrast to blind or delegated quantum computation where some interaction be-
tween client and server is usually required, see Section 1.2 for references.
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1.1 Our Contributions
We answer the above question in the affirmative by presenting a new scheme TP
(as abbreviation for teleportation) for quantum homomorphic encryption which
is both compact and efficient for circuits with polynomially many T gates. The
scheme is secure against chosen plaintext attacks from quantum adversaries, as
formalized by the security notion q-IND-CPA security defined by Broadbent and
Jeffery [BJ15].
Like the schemes proposed in [BJ15], our scheme is an extension of the Clifford
scheme CL. We add auxiliary quantum states to the evaluation key which we
call quantum gadgets and which aid in the evaluation of the T gates. The size
of a gadget depends only on (a certain form of) the space complexity of the
decryption function of the classical FHE scheme. This relation turns out to be
very convenient, as classical FHE schemes are often optimized with respect to the
complexity of the decryption operation (in order to make them bootstrappable).
As a concrete example, if we instantiate our scheme with the classical FHE scheme
by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [BV11], each evaluation gadget of our scheme
consists of a number of qubits which is polynomial in the security parameter.
In TP, we require exactly one evaluation gadget for every T gate that we would
like to evaluate homomorphically. Intuitively, after a T gate is performed on a one-
time-pad encrypted qubit XaZb|ψ〉, the result might contain an unwanted phase
Pa depending on the key a with which the qubit was encrypted, since TXaZb|ψ〉 =
PaXaZbT|ψ〉. Obviously, the evaluator is not allowed to know the key a. Instead,
he holds an encryption a˜ of the key, produced by a classical FHE scheme. The
evaluator can teleport the encrypted qubit “through the gadget” [GC99] in a
way that depends on a˜, in order to remove the unwanted phase. In more detail,
the quantum part of the gadget consists of a number of EPR pairs which are
prepared in a way that depends on the secret key of the classical FHE scheme.
Some classical information is provided with the gadget that allows the evaluator
to homomorphically update the encryption keys after the teleportation steps. On
a high level, the use of an evaluation gadget corresponds to a instantaneous non-
local quantum computation6 where one party holds the secret key of the classical
FHE scheme, and the other party holds the input qubit and a classical encryption
of the key to the quantum one-time pad. Together, this information determines
whether an inverse phase gate P† needs to be performed on the qubit or not. Very
recent results by Speelman [Spe15] show how to perform such computations with
a bounded amount of entanglement. These techniques are the crucial ingredients
for our construction and are the reason why the garden-hose complexity [BFSS13]
of the decryption procedure of the classical FHE is related to the size of our
gadgets.
The quantum part of our evaluation gadget is strikingly simple, which provides
a number of advantages. To start with, the evaluation of a T gate requires only
one gadget, and does not cause errors to accumulate on the quantum state.
6 This term is not related to the term ‘instantaneous quantum computation’ [SB08],
and instead first was used as a specific form of non-local quantum computation, one
where all parties have to act simultaneously.
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The scheme is very compact in the sense that the state of the system after the
evaluation of a T gate has the same form as after the initial encryption, except
for any classical changes caused by the classical FHE evaluation. This kind of
compactness also implies that individual evaluation gadgets can be supplied “on
demand” by the holder of the secret key. Once an evaluator runs out of gadgets,
the secret key holder can simply supply more of them.
Furthermore, TP does not depend on a specific classical FHE scheme, hence
any advances in classical FHE can directly improve our scheme. Our requirements
for the classical FHE scheme are quite modest: we only require the classical
scheme to have a space-efficient decryption procedure and to be secure against
quantum adversaries. In particular, no circular-security assumption is required.
Since we supply at most a polynomial number of evaluation gadgets, our scheme
TP is leveled homomorphic by construction, and we can simply switch to a new
classical key after every evaluation gadget. In fact, the Clifford gates in the
quantum evaluation circuit only require additive operations from the classical
homomorphic scheme, while each T gate needs a fixed (polynomial) number of
multiplications. Hence, we do not actually require fully homomorphic classical
encryption, but leveled fully homomorphic schemes suffice.
Finally, circuit privacy in the passive setting almost comes for free. When
wanting to hide which circuit was evaluated on the data, the evaluating party
can add an extra randomization layer to the output state by applying his own
one-time pad. We show that if the classical FHE scheme has the circuit-privacy
property, then this extra randomization completely hides the circuit from the
decrypting party. This is not unique to our specific scheme: the same is true for
CL.
In terms of applications, our construction can be appreciated as a constant-
round scheme for blind delegated quantum computation, using computational as-
sumptions. The server can evaluate a universal quantum circuit on the encrypted
input, consisting of the client’s quantum input and a (classical) description of
the client’s circuit. In this context, it is desirable to minimize the quantum
resources needed by the client. We argue that our scheme can still be used
for constant-round blind delegated quantum computation if we limit either the
client’s quantum memory or the types of quantum operations the client can
perform.
As another application, we can instantiate our construction with a classical
FHE scheme that allows for distributed key generation and decryption amongst
different parties that all hold a share of the secret key [AJLA+12]. In that case,
it is likely that our techniques can be adapted to perform multiparty quantum
computation [BCG+06] in the semi-honest case. However, the focus of this article
lies on the description and security proof of the new construction, and more
concrete applications are the subject of upcoming work.
1.2 Related Work
Early classical FHE schemes were limited in the sense that they could not facili-
tate arbitrary operations on the encrypted data: some early schemes only imple-
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mented a single operation (addition or multiplication)[RSA78, GM84, Pai99];
later on it became possible to combine several operations in a limited way
[BGN05, GHV10, SYY99]. Gentry’s first fully homomorphic encryption scheme
[Gen09] relied on several non-standard computational assumptions. Subsequent
work [BGV12, BV11] has relaxed these assumptions or replaced them with more
conventional assumptions such as the hardness of learning with errors (LWE),
which is believed to be hard also for quantum attackers. It is impossible to com-
pletely get rid of computational assumptions for a classical FHE scheme, since
the existence of such a scheme would imply the existence of an information-
theoretically secure protocol for private information retrieval (PIR) [KO97] that
breaks the lower bound on the amount of communication required for that task
[CKGS98, Fil12].
While quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE) is closely related to
the task of blind or delegated quantum computation [Chi05, BFK09, ABOE10,
VFPR14, FBS+14, Bro15a, Lia15], QFHE does not allow interaction between
the client and the server during the computation. Additionally, in QFHE, the
server is allowed to choose which unitary it wants to apply to the (encrypted)
data.
Yu, Pe´rez-Delgado and Fitzsimons [YPDF14] showed that perfectly informa-
tion-theoretically secure QFHE is not possible unless the size of the encryption
grows exponentially in the input size. Thus, any scheme that attempts to achieve
information-theoretically secure QFHE has to leak some proportion of the input
to the server [AS06, RFG12] or can only be used to evaluate a subset of all unitary
transformations on the input [RFG12, Lia13, TKO+14]. Like the multiplication
operation is hard in the classical case, the hurdle in the quantum case seems
to be the evaluation of non-Clifford gates. A recent result by Ouyang, Tan and
Fitzsimons provides information-theoretic security for circuits with at most a
constant number of non-Clifford operations [OTF15].
Broadbent and Jeffery [BJ15] proposed two schemes that achieve homomor-
phic encryption for nontrivial sets of quantum circuits. Instead of trying to achieve
information-theoretic security, they built their schemes based on a classical FHE
scheme and hence any computational assumptions on the classical scheme are
also required for the quantum schemes. Computational assumptions allow by-
passing the impossibility result from [YPDF14] and work toward a (quantum)
fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
Both of the schemes presented in [BJ15] are extensions of the scheme CL
described in Section 1.1. These two schemes use different methods to implement
the evaluation of a T gate, which we briefly discuss here. In the EPR scheme,
some entanglement is accumulated in a special register during every evaluation
of a T gate, and stored there until it can be resolved in the decryption phase.
Because of this accumulation, the complexity of the decryption function scales
(quadratically) with the number of T gates in the evaluated circuit, thereby
violating the compactness requirement of QFHE. The scheme AUX also extends
CL, but handles T gates in a different manner. The evaluator is supplied with
auxiliary quantum states, stored in the evaluation key, that allow him to evaluate
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T gates and immediately remove any error that may have occurred. In this
way, the decryption procedure remains very efficient and the scheme is compact.
Unfortunately, the required auxiliary states grow doubly exponentially in size
with respect to the T depth of the circuit, rendering AUX useful only for circuits
with constant T depth. Our scheme TP is related to AUX in that extra resources
for removing errors are stored in the evaluation key. In sharp contrast to AUX,
the size of the evaluation key in TP only grows linearly in the number of T gates
in the circuit (and polynomially in the security parameter), allowing the scheme
to be leveled fully homomorphic. Since the evaluation of the other gates causes
no errors on the quantum state, no gadgets are needed for those; any circuit
containing polynomially many T gates can be efficiently evaluated.
1.3 Structure of this paper
We start by introducing some notation in Section 2 and presenting the necessary
preliminaries on quantum computation, (classical and quantum) homomorphic
encryption, and the garden-hose model which is essential to the most-general
construction of the gadgets. In Section 3, we describe the scheme TP and show
that it is compact. The security proof of TP is somewhat more involved, and
is presented in several steps in Section 4, along with an informal description of
a circuit-private variant of the scheme. In Section 5, the rationale behind the
quantum gadgets is explained, and some examples are discussed to clarify the
construction. We conclude our work in Section 6 and propose directions for future
research.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Quantum computation
We assume the reader is familiar with the standard notions in the field of quantum
computation (for an introduction, see [NC00]). In this subsection, we only mention
the concepts that are essential to our construction.
The single-qubit Pauli group is, up to global phase, generated by the bit flip
and phase flip operations,
X =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, Z =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
.
A Pauli operator on n qubits is simply any tensor product of n independent
single-qubit Pauli operators. All four single-qubit Pauli operators are of the form
XaZb with a, b ∈ {0, 1}. Here, and in the rest of the paper, we ignore the global
phase of a quantum state, as it is not observable by measurement.
The Clifford group on n qubits consists of all unitaries C that commute with
the Pauli group, i.e. the Clifford group is the normalizer of the Pauli group.
Since all Pauli operators are of the form Xa1Zb1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XanZbn , this means
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that C is a Clifford operator if for any a1, b1, . . . , an, bn ∈ {0, 1} there exist
a′1, b
′
1, . . . , a
′
n, b
′
n ∈ {0, 1} such that (ignoring global phase):
C(Xa1Zb1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XanZbn) = (Xa′1Zb′1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xa′nZb′n)C.
All Pauli operators are easily verified to be elements of the Clifford group, and
the entire Clifford group is generated by
P =
[
1 0
0 i
]
, H =
1√
2
[
1 1
1 −1
]
, and CNOT =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
.
(See for example [Got98].) The Clifford group does not suffice to simulate arbitrary
quantum circuits, but by adding any single non-Clifford gate, any quantum circuit
can be efficiently simulated with only a small error. As in [BJ15], we choose this
non-Clifford gate to be the T gate,
T =
[
1 0
0 eipi/4
]
.
Note that the T gate, because it is non-Clifford, does not commute with the Pauli
group. More specifically, we have TXaZb = PaXaZbT. It is exactly the formation
of this P gate that has proven to be an obstacle to the design of an efficient
quantum homomorphic encryption scheme.
We use |ψ〉 or |ϕ〉 to denote pure quantum states. Mixed states are denoted
with ρ or σ. Let Id denote the identity matrix of dimension d: this allows us to
write the completely mixed state as Id/d.
Define |Φ+〉 := 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) to be an EPR pair.
If X is a random variable ranging over the possible basis states B for a
quantum system, then let ρ(X) be the density matrix corresponding to X,
i.e. ρ(X) :=
∑
b∈B Pr[X = b]|b〉〈b|.
Applying a Pauli operator that is chosen uniformly at random results in a
single-qubit completely mixed state, since
∀ρ :
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
(
1
4
XaZbρ(XaZb)†
)
=
I2
2
This property is used in the construction of the quantum one-time pad : applying
a random Pauli XaZb to a qubit completely hides the content of that qubit to
anyone who does not know the key (a, b) to the pad. Anyone in possession of the
key can decrypt simply by applying XaZb again.
2.2 Homomorphic encryption
This subsection provides the definitions of (classical and quantum) homomorphic
encryption schemes, and the security conditions for such schemes. In the current
work, we only consider homomorphic encryption in the public-key setting. For a
more thorough treatment of these concepts, and how they can be transferred to
the symmetric-key setting, see [BJ15].
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The classical setting A classical homomorphic encryption scheme HE consists
of four algorithms: key generation, encryption, evaluation, and decryption. The
key generator produces three keys: a public key and evaluation key, both of
which are publicly available to everyone, and a secret key which is only revealed
to the decrypting party. Anyone in possession of the public key can encrypt the
inputs x1, . . . , x`, and send the resulting ciphertexts c1, . . . , c` to an evaluator
who evaluates some circuit C on them. The evaluator sends the result to a party
that possesses the secret key, who should be able to decrypt it to C(x1, . . . , x`).
More formally, HE consists of the following four algorithms which run in
probabilistic polynomial time in terms of their input and parameters [BV11]:
(pk , evk , sk)← HE.KeyGen(1κ) where κ ∈ N is the security parameter. Three
keys are generated: a public key pk , which can be used for the encryption
of messages; a secret key sk used for decryption; and an evaluation key evk
that may aid in evaluating the circuit on the encrypted state. The keys pk
and evk are announced publicly, while sk is kept secret.
c← HE.Encpk (x) for some one-bit message x ∈ {0, 1}. This probabilistic proce-
dure outputs a ciphertext c, using the public key pk .
c′ ← HE.EvalCevk (c1, . . . , c`) uses the evaluation key to output some ciphertext c′
which decrypts to the evaluation of circuit C on the decryptions of c1, . . . , c`.
We will often think of Eval as an evaluation of a function f instead of some
canonical circuit for f , and write HE.Evalfevk (c1, . . . , c`) in this case.
x′ ← HE.Decsk (c) outputs a message x′ ∈ {0, 1}, using the secret key sk .
In principle, HE.Encpk can only encrypt single bits. When encrypting an n-bit
message x ∈ {0, 1}n, we encrypt the message bit-by-bit, applying the encryption
procedure n times. We sometimes abuse the notation HE.Encpk (x) to denote this
bitwise encryption of the string x.
For HE to be a homomorphic encryption scheme, we require correctness in
the sense that for any circuit C, there exists a negligible7 function η such that,
for any input x,
Pr[HE.Decsk (HE.Eval
C
evk (HE.Encpk (x))) 6= C(x)] ≤ η(κ) .
In this article, we assume for clarity of exposition that classical schemes HE are
perfectly correct, and that it is possible to immediately decrypt after encrypting
(without doing any evaluation).
Another desirable property is compactness, which states that the complexity
of the decryption function should not depend on the size of the circuit: a scheme
is compact if there exists a polynomial p(κ) such that for any circuit C and any
ciphertext c, the complexity of applying HE.Dec to the result of HE.EvalC(c) is
at most p(κ).
A scheme that is both correct for all circuits and compact, is called fully
homomorphic. If it is only correct for a subset of all possible circuits (e.g. all
7 A negligible function η is a function such that for every positive integer d, η(n) < 1/nd
for big enough n.
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circuits with no multiplication gates) or if it is not compact, it is considered to be
a somewhat homomorphic scheme. Finally, a leveled fully homomorphic scheme
is (compact and) homomorphic for all circuits up to a variable depth L, which
is supplied as an argument to the key generation function [Vai11].
We will use the notation x˜ to denote the result of running HE.Encpk (x): that
is, Decsk (x˜) = x with overwhelming probability. In our construction, we will often
deal with multiple classical key sets (pk i, sk i, evk i)i∈I indexed by some set I. In
that case, we use the notation x˜[i] to denote the result of HE.Encpki(x), in order
to avoid confusion. Also note that (e.g.) pk i does not refer to the ith bit of the
public key: in case we want to refer to the ith bit of some string s, we will use
the notation s[i].
When working with multiple key sets, it will often be necessary to transform
an already encrypted message x˜[i] into an encryption x˜[j] using a different key set
j 6= i. To achieve this transformation, we define the procedure HE.Reci→j that can
always be used for this recryption task as long as we have access to an encrypted
version s˜k i
[j]
of the old secret key sk i. Effectively, HE.Reci→j homomorphically
evaluates the decryption of x˜[i]:
HE.Reci→j(x˜[i]) := HE.EvalHE.Decevkj
(
s˜k i
[j]
,HE.Encpkj (x˜
[i])
)
.
The quantum setting A quantum homomorphic encryption scheme QHE, as
defined in [BJ15], is a natural extension of the classical case, and differs from it in
only a few aspects. The secret and public keys are still classical, but the evaluation
key is allowed to be a quantum state. This means that the evaluation key is not
necessarily reusable, and can be consumed during the evaluation procedure. The
messages to be encrypted are qubits instead of bits, and the evaluator should be
able to evaluate quantum circuits on them.
All definitions given above carry over quite naturally to the quantum setting
(see also [BJ15]):
(pk , ρevk , sk)← QHE.KeyGen(1κ) where κ ∈ N is the security parameter. In
contrast to the classical case, the evaluation key is a quantum state.
σ ← QHE.Encpk (ρ) produces, for every valid public key pk and input state ρ
from some message space, to a quantum cipherstate σ in some cipherspace.
σ′ ← QHE.EvalCρevk (σ) represents the evaluation of a circuit C. If C requires n
input qubits, then σ should be a product of n cipherstates. The evaluation
function maps it to a product of n′ states in some output space, where n′
is the number of qubits that C would output. The evaluation key ρevk is
consumed in the process.
ρ′ ← QHE.Decsk (σ′) maps a single state σ′ from the output space to a quantum
state ρ′ in the message space. Note that if the evaluation procedure QHE.Eval
outputs a product of n′ states, then QHE.Dec needs to be run n′ times.
The decryption procedure differs from the classical definition in that we require
the decryption to happen subsystem-by-subsystem: this is fundamentally different
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from the more relaxed notion of indivisible schemes [BJ15] where an auxiliary
quantum register may be built up for the entire state, and the state can only be
decrypted as a whole. In this work, we only consider the divisible definition.
Quantum security The notion of security that we aim for is that of indistin-
guishability under chosen-plaintext attacks, where the attacker may have quan-
tum computational powers (q-IND-CPA). This security notion was introduced
in [BJ15, Definition 3.3] (see [GHS15] for a similar notion of the security of classi-
cal schemes against quantum attackers) and ensures semantic security [ABF+16].
We restate it here for completeness.
Definition 1. [BJ15] The quantum CPA indistinguishability experiment with
respect to a scheme QHE and a quantum polynomial-time adversary A = (A1,A2),
denoted by PubKcpaA ,QHE(κ), is defined by the following procedure:
1. KeyGen(1κ) is run to obtain keys (pk, sk, ρevk).
2. Adversary A1 is given (pk, ρevk) and outputs a quantum state on M⊗E.
3. For r ∈ {0, 1}, let Ξcpa,rQHE : D(M)→ D(C) be: Ξcpa,0QHE (ρ) = QHE.Encpk(|0〉〈0|)
and Ξcpa,1QHE (ρ) = QHE.Encpk(ρ). A random bit r ∈ {0, 1} is chosen and Ξcpa,rQHE
is applied to the state in M (the output being a state in C).
4. Adversary A2 obtains the system in C ⊗ E and outputs a bit r′.
5. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if r′ = r and 0 otherwise. In
case r = r′, we say that A wins the experiment.
K
ey
G
en
(1
κ
)
pk
Revk
pk
A1
M
E
Ξcpa,rQHE C
A2 r′
Ξcpa,0QHE : |0〉 M Encpk CM
Ξcpa,1QHE : Encpk
M C
Fig. 1. [BJ15, reproduced with permission of the authors] The quantum CPA indis-
tinguishability experiment PubKcpaA ,QHE(κ). Double lines represent classical information
flow, and single lines represent quantum information flow. The adversary A is split up
into two separate algorithms A1 and A2, which share a working memory represented
by the quantum state in register E .
The game PubKcpaA ,QHE(κ) is depicted in Figure 1. Informally, the challenger
randomly chooses whether to encrypt some message, chosen by the adversary, or
instead to encrypt the state |0〉〈0|. The adversary has to guess which of the two
happened. If he cannot do so with more than negligible advantage, the encryption
procedure is considered to be q-IND-CPA secure:
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Definition 2. [BJ15, Definition 3.3] A (classical or quantum) homomorphic
encryption scheme S is q-IND-CPA secure if for any quantum polynomial-time
adversary A = (A1,A2) there exists a negligible function η such that:
Pr[PubKcpaA ,S(κ) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ η(κ).
Analogously to PubKcpaA ,S(κ), in the game PubK
cpa−mult
A ,S (κ), the adversary can
give multiple messages to the challenger, which are either all encrypted, or all
replaced by zeros. Broadbent and Jeffery [BJ15] show that these notions of
security are equivalent.
2.3 Garden-hose complexity
The garden-hose model is a model of communication complexity which was
introduced by Buhrman, Fehr, Schaffner and Speelman [BFSS13] to study a
protocol for position-based quantum cryptography. The model recently saw new
use, when Speelman [Spe15] used it to construct new protocols for the task of
instantaneous non-local quantum computation, thereby breaking a wider class
of schemes for position-based quantum cryptography. (Besides the garden-hose
model, this construction used tools from secure delegated computation. These
techniques were first used in the setting of instantaneous non-local quantum
computation by Broadbent [Bro15b].)
We will not explain the garden-hose model thoroughly, but instead give a
short overview. The garden-hose model involves two parties, Alice with input x
and Bob with input y, that jointly want to compute a function f . To do this
computation, they are allowed to use garden hoses to link up pipes that run
between them, one-to-one, in a way which depends on their local inputs. Alice
also has a water tap, which she connects to one of the pipes. Whenever f(x, y) = 0,
the water has to exit at an open pipe on Alice’s side, and whenever f(x, y) = 1
the water should exit on Bob’s side.
The applicability of the garden-hose model to our setting stems from a close
correspondence between protocols in the garden-hose model and teleporting a
qubit back-and-forth; the ‘pipes’ correspond to EPR pairs and the ‘garden hoses’
can be translated into Bell measurements. Our construction of the gadgets in
Section 5.2 will depend on the number of pipes needed to compute the decryption
function HE.Dec of a classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme. It will turn
out that any log-space computable decryption function allows for efficiently
constructable polynomial-size gadgets.
3 The TP scheme
Our scheme TP (for teleportation) is an extension of the scheme CL presented
in [BJ15]: the quantum state is encrypted using a quantum one-time pad, and
Clifford gates are evaluated simply by performing the gate on the encrypted
state and then homomorphically updating the encrypted keys to the pad. The
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new scheme TP, like AUX, includes additional resource states (gadgets) in the
evaluation key. These gadgets can be used to immediately correct any P errors
that might be present after the application of a T gate. The size of the evaluation
key thus grows linearly with the upper bound to the number of T gates in the
circuit: for every T gate the evaluation key contains one gadget, along with some
classical information on how to use that gadget.
3.1 Gadget
In this section we only give the general form of the gadget, which suffices to prove
security. The explanation on how to construct these gadgets, which depend on
the decryption function of the classical homomorphic scheme HE.Dec, is deferred
to Section 5.
Recall that when a T gate is applied to the state XaZb|ψ〉, an unwanted P
error may occur since TXaZb = PaXaZbT. If a is known, this error can easily be
corrected by applying P† whenever a = 1. However, as we will see, the evaluating
party only has access to some encrypted version a˜ of the key a, and hence is not
able to decide whether or not to correct the state.
We show how the key generator can create a gadget ahead of time that corrects
the state, conditioned on a, when the qubit PaXaZbT|ψ〉 is teleported through it.
The gadget will not reveal any information about whether or not a P gate was
present before the correction. Note that the value of a is completely unknown to
the key generator, so the gadget cannot depend on it. Instead, the gadget will
depend on the secret key sk , and the evaluator will use it in a way that depends
on a˜.
The intuition behind our construction is as follows. A gadget consists of a
set of fully entangled pairs that are crosswise linked up in a way that depends
on the secret key sk and the decryption function of the classical homomorphic
scheme HE. If the decryption function HE.Dec is simple enough, i.e. computable
in logarithmic space or by low-depth binary circuit, the size of this state is
polynomial in the security parameter.
Some of these entangled pairs have an extra inverse phase gate applied to
them. Note that teleporting any qubit XaZb|ψ〉 through, for example, (P†⊗I)|Φ+〉,
effectively applies an inverse phase gate to the qubit, which ends up in the state
Xa
′
Zb
′
P†|ψ〉, where the new Pauli corrections a′,b′ depend on a,b and the outcome
of the Bell measurement.
When wanting to remove an unwanted phase gate, the evaluator of the circuit
teleports a qubit through this gadget state in a way which is specified by a˜. The
gadget state is constructed so that the qubit follows a path through this gadget
which passes an inverse phase gate if and only if HE.Decsk (a˜) equals 1. The Pauli
corrections can then be updated using the homomorphically-encrypted classical
information and the measurement outcomes.
Specification of gadget. Assume HE.Dec is computable in space logarithmic
in the security parameter κ. In Section 5 we will show that there exists an
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efficient algorithm TP.GenGadgetpk ′(sk) which produces a gadget: a quantum
state Γpk′(sk) of the form as specified in this section.
The gadget will able to remove a single phase gate Pa, using only knowledge
of a˜, where a˜ decrypts to a under the secret key sk . The public key pk ′ is used
to encrypt all classical information which is part of the gadget.
The quantum part of the gadget consists of 2m qubits, with m some number
which is polynomial in the security parameter κ. Let {(s1, t1), (s2, t2), . . . , (sm, tm)}
be disjoint pairs in {1, 2, . . . , 2m}, and let p ∈ {0, 1}m be a string of m bits. Let
g(sk) be a shorthand for the tuple of both of these, together with the secret key
sk ;
g(sk) := ({(s1, t1), (s2, t2), . . . , (sm, tm)}, p, sk) .
The tuple g(sk) is the classical information that determines the structure of the
gadget as a function of the secret key sk . The length of g(sk) is not dependent
on the secret key: the number of qubits m and the size of sk itself are completely
determined by the choice of protocol HE and the security parameter κ.
For any bitstring x, z ∈ {0, 1}m, define the quantum state
γx,z
(
g(sk)
)
:=
m∏
i=1
Xx[i]Zz[i]
(
P†
)p[i]∣∣Φ+〉〈Φ+∣∣
siti
Pp[i]Zz[i]Xx[i] .
(Here the single-qubit gates are applied to si, the first qubit of the entangled
pair.) This quantum state is a collection of maximally-entangled pairs of qubits,
some with an extra inverse phase gate applied, where the pairs are determined
by the disjoint pairs {(s1, t1), (s2, t2), . . . , (sm, tm)} chosen earlier. The entangled
pairs have arbitrary Pauli operators applied to them, described by the bitstrings
x and z.
Note that, no matter the choice of gadget structure, averaging over all possible
x, z gives the completely mixed state on 2m qubits,
1
22m
∑
x,z∈{0,1}m
γx,z
(
g(sk)
)
=
I22m
22m
.
This property will be important in the security proof; intuitively it shows that
these gadgets do not reveal any information about sk whenever x and z are
encrypted with a secure classical encryption scheme.
The entire gadget then is given by
Γpk ′(sk) = ρ(HE.Encpk ′
(
g(sk)
)
)⊗ 1
22m
∑
x,z∈{0,1}m
ρ(HE.Encpk ′(x, z))⊗ γx,z
(
g(sk)
)
.
To summarize, the gadget consists of a quantum state γx,z
(
g(sk)
)
, instantiated
with randomly chosen x, z, the classical information denoting the random choice
of x, z, and the other classical information g(sk) which specifies the gadget. All
classical information is homomorphically encrypted with a public key pk ′.
Since this gadget depends on the secret key sk , simply encrypting this infor-
mation using the public key corresponding to sk would not be secure, unless we
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assume that HE.Dec is circularly secure. In order to avoid the requirement of
circular security, we will always use a fresh, independent key pk ′ to encrypt this
information. The evaluator will have to do some recrypting before he is able to
use this information, but otherwise using independent keys does not complicate
the construction much. More details on how the evaluation procedure deals with
the different keys is provided in Section 3.4.
Usage of gadget. The gadget is used by performing Bell measurements between
pairs of its qubits, together with an input qubit that needs a correction, without
having knowledge of the structure of the gadget.
The choice of measurements can be generated by an efficient (classical) al-
gorithm TP.GenMeasurement(a˜) which produces a list M containing m disjoint
pairs of elements in {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2m}. Here the labels 1 to 2m refer to the qubits
that make up a gadget and 0 is the label of the qubit with the possible P error.
The pairs represent which qubits will be connected through Bell measurements;
note that all but a single qubit will be measured according to M .
Consider an input qubit, in some arbitrary state Pa|ψ〉, i.e. the qubit has
an extra phase gate if a = 1. Let a˜ be an encrypted version of a, such that
a = HE.Decsk (a˜). Then the evaluator performs Bell measurements on Γpk ′(sk)
and the input qubit, according to M ← TP.GenMeasurement(a˜). By construction,
one out the 2m + 1 qubits is still unmeasured. This qubit will be in the state
Xa
′
Zb
′ |ψ〉, for some a′ and b′, both of which are functions of the specification
of the gadget, the measurement choices which depend on a˜, and the outcomes
of the teleportation measurements. Also see Section 3.4 and Appendix A.2 for
a more in-depth explanation of how the accompanying classical information is
updated.
Intuitively, the ‘path’ the qubit takes through the gadget state, goes through
one of the fully entangled pairs with an inverse phase gate wheneverHE.Decsk (a˜) =
1, and avoids all such pairs whenever HE.Decsk (a˜) = 0.
3.2 Key generation
Using the classical HE.KeyGen as a subroutine to create multiple classical homo-
morphic keysets, we generate a classical secret and public key, and a classical-
quantum evaluation key that contains L gadgets, allowing evaluation of a circuit
containing up to L T gates. Every gadget depends on a different secret key, and
its classical information is always encrypted using the next public key. The key
generation procedure TP.KeyGen(1κ, 1L) is defined as follows:
1. For i = 0 to L: execute (pk i, sk i, evk i) ← HE.KeyGen(1κ) to obtain L + 1
independent classical homomorphic key sets.
2. Set the public key to be the tuple (pk i)
L
i=0.
3. Set the secret key to be the tuple (sk i)
L
i=0.
4. For i = 0 to L− 1: Run the procedure TP.GenGadgetpki+1(sk i) to create the
gadget Γpki+1(sk i) as described in Section 3.1.
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5. Set the evaluation key to be the set of all gadgets created in the previous
step (including their encrypted classical information), plus the tuple (evk i)
L
i=0.
The resulting evaluation key is the quantum state
L−1⊗
i=0
(
Γpki+1(sk i)⊗ |evk i〉〈evk i|
)
.
3.3 Encryption
The encryption procedure TP.Enc is identical to CL.Enc, using the first public
key pk0 for the encryption of the one-time-pad keys. We restate it here for
completeness.
Every single-qubit state σ is encrypted separately with a quantum one-time
pad, and the pad key is (classically) encrypted and appended to the quantum
encryption of σ, resulting in the classical-quantum state:∑
a,b∈{0,1}
1
4
ρ(HE.Encpk0(a),HE.Encpk0(b))⊗XaZbσZbXa.
3.4 Circuit evaluation
Consider a circuit with n wires. The evaluation of the circuit on the encrypted
data is carried out one gate at a time.
Recall that our quantum circuit is written using a gate set that consists of
the Clifford group generators {H,P,CNOT} and the T gate. A Clifford gate may
affect multiple wires at the same time, while T gates can only affect a single
qubit. Before the evaluation of a single gate U , the encryption of an n-qubit state
ρ is of the form(
Xa1Zb1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XanZbn)ρ (Xa1Zb1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XanZbn).
The evaluating party holds the encrypted versions a˜1
[i], . . . , a˜n
[i]
and b˜1
[i]
, . . . , b˜n
[i]
,
with respect to the ith key set for some i (initially, i = 0). The goal is to obtain
a quantum encryption of the state UρU†, such that the evaluator can homomor-
phically compute the encryptions of the new keys to the quantum one-time pad.
If U is a Clifford gate, these encryptions will still be in the ith key. If U is a T
gate, then all encryptions are transferred to the (i+ 1)th key during the process.
– If U is a Clifford gate, we proceed exactly as in CL.Eval. The gate U is simply
applied to the encrypted qubit, and since U commutes with the Pauli group,
the evaluator only needs to update the encrypted keys in a straightforward
way. For more details, see Appendix A.1.
– If U = T, the evaluator should start out by applying a T gate to the appro-
priate wire w. Afterwards, the qubit at wire w is in the state(
PawXawZbwT
)
ρw
(
T†XawZbw(P†)aw
)
.
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In order to remove the P error, the evaluator uses one gadget Γpki+1(sk i)
from the evaluation key; he possesses the classical information a˜w
[i]
en-
crypted with the correct key to be able to compute measurements M ←
TP.GenMeasurement(a˜w
[i]
) and performs the measurements on the pairs
given by M . Afterwards, using his own measurement outcomes, the clas-
sical information accompanying the gadget (encrypted using pk i+1), and the
recryptions of a˜w
[i]
and b˜w
[i]
into a˜w
[i+1]
and b˜w
[i+1]
, the evaluator homomor-
phically computes the new keys a˜′w
[i+1]
and b˜′w
[i+1]
. See also Figure 2 and
Appendix A.2. After these computations, he should also recrypt the keys of
all other wires into the (i+ 1)th key set.
XawZbwρXawZbw Xa
′
wZb
′
wTρT†Xa
′
wZb
′
w
a˜w
[i]
b˜w
[i]
g˜(ski)
[i+1]
, x˜[i+1], z˜[i+1]
a˜′w
[i+1]
, b˜′w
[i+1]
T
gadget
γx,z(g(sk i))
HE.Encpki+1
HE.Reci→i+1
HE.Reci→i+1 H
E
.E
va
l
Fig. 2. The homomorphic evaluation of the (i+ 1)th T gate of the circuit. The gadget
is consumed during the process. After the use of the gadget, the evaluator encrypts his
own classical information (including measurement outcomes) in order to use it in the
homomorphic computation of the new keys. HE.Eval evaluates this fairly straightfor-
ward computation that consists mainly of looking up values in a list and adding them
modulo 2. Note that s˜k i
[i+1]
, needed for the recryption procedures, is contained in the
evaluation key.
At the end of the evaluation of some circuit C containing k T gates, the
evaluator holds a one-time-pad encryption of the state C|ψ〉, together with the
keys to the pad, classically encrypted in the kth key. The last step is to recrypt
(in L − k steps) this classical information into the Lth (final) key. Afterwards,
the quantum state and the key encryptions are sent to the decrypting party.
3.5 Decryption
The decryption procedure is identical to CL.Dec. For each qubit, HE.DecskL is
run twice in order to retrieve the keys to the quantum pad. The correct Pauli
operator can then be applied to the quantum state in order to obtain the desired
state C|ψ〉.
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The decryption procedure is fairly straightforward, and its complexity does
not depend on the circuit that was evaluated. This is formalized in a compactness
theorem for the TP scheme:
Theorem 1. If HE is compact, then TP is compact.
Proof. Note that because the decryption only involves removing a one-time pad
from the quantum ciphertext produced by the circuit evaluation, this decryption
can be carried out a single qubit at a time. By compactness of HE, there exists a
polynomial p(κ) such that for any function f , the complexity of applying HE.Dec
to the output of HE.Evalf is at most p(κ). Since the keys to the quantum one-time
pad of any wire w are two single bits encrypted with the classical HE scheme,
decrypting the keys for one wire requires at most 2p(κ) steps. Obtaining the
qubit then takes at most two steps more for (conditionally) applying Xaw and
Zbw . The total number of steps is polynomial in κ and independent of C, so we
conclude that TP is compact.
4 Security of TP
In order to guarantee the privacy of the input data, we need to argue that an
adversary that does not possess the secret key cannot learn anything about
the data with more than negligible probability. To this end, we show that TP
is q-IND-CPA secure, i.e. no polynomial-time quantum adversary can tell the
difference between an encryption of a real message and an encryption of |0〉〈0|,
even if he gets to choose the message himself (recall the definition of q-IND-CPA
security from Section 2.2). Like in the security proofs in [BJ15], we use a reduction
argument to relate the probability of being able to distinguish between the two
encryptions to the probability of winning an indistinguishability experiment for
the classical HE, which we already know to be small. The aim of this section is
to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2. If HE is q-IND-CPA secure, then TP is q-IND-CPA secure for
circuits containing up to polynomially (in κ) many T gates.
In order to prove Theorem 2, we first prove that an efficient adversary’s
performance in the indistinguishability game is only negligibly different whether
or not he receives a real evaluation key with real gadgets, or just a completely
mixed quantum state with encryptions of 0’s accompanying them (Corollary 1).
Then we argue that without the evaluation key, an adversary does not receive
more information than in the indistinguishability game for the scheme CL, which
has already been shown to be q-IND-CPA secure whenever HE is.
We start with defining a sequence of variations on the TP scheme. For ` ∈
{0, . . . , L}, let TP(`) be identical to TP, except for the key generation procedure:
TP(`).KeyGen replaces, for every i ≥ `, all classical information accompanying
the ith gadget with the all-zero string before encrypting it. For any number i,
define the shorthand
gi := g(sk i).
17
As seen in Section 3.1, the length of the classical information does not depend
on sk i itself, so a potential adversary cannot gain any information about sk i just
from this encrypted string. In summary,
TP(`).KeyGen(1κ, 1L) :=
L−1⊗
i=0
|evk i〉〈evk i| ⊗
`−1⊗
i=0
Γpki+1(sk i)⊗
L−1⊗
i=`
(
ρ(HE.Encpki+1(0
|gi|))⊗
1
22m
∑
x,z∈{0,1}m
ρ(HE.Encpki+1(0
m, 0m))⊗ γx,z(gi)
)
.
Intuitively, one can view TP(`) as the scheme that provides only ` usable
gadgets in the evaluation key. Note that TP(L) = TP, and that in TP(0), only the
classical evaluation keys remain, since without the encryptions of the classical x
and z, the quantum part of the gadget is just the completely mixed state. That
is, we can rewrite the final line of the previous equation as
1
22m
∑
x,z∈{0,1}m
ρ(HE.Encpki+1(0
m, 0m))⊗ γx,z(gi)
(1)
= ρ(HE.Encpki+1(0
m, 0m))⊗ I22m
22m
. (2)
With the definitions of the new schemes, we can lay out the steps to prove
Theorem 2 in more detail. First, we show that in the quantum CPA indistin-
guishability experiment, any efficient adversary interacting with TP(`) only has
negligible advantage over an adversary interacting with TP(`−1), i.e. the scheme
where the classical information g`−1 is removed (Lemma 1). By iteratively ap-
plying this argument, we are able to argue that the advantage of an adversary
who interacts with TP(L) over one who interacts with TP(0) is also negligible
(Corollary 1). Finally, we conclude the proof by arguing that TP(0) is q-IND-CPA
secure by comparison to the CL scheme.
Lemma 1. Let 0 < ` ≤ L. If HE is q-IND-CPA secure, then for any quantum
polynomial-time adversary A = (A1,A2), there exists a negligible function η
such that
Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(`)
(κ) = 1]− Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(`−1)(κ) = 1] ≤ η(κ).
Proof. The difference between schemes TP(`) and TP(`−1) lies in whether the gad-
get state γx`−1,z`−1(g`−1) is supplemented with its classical information g˜`−1, x˜`−1, z˜`−1,
or just with an encryption of 0|g`−1|+2m.
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Let A = (A1,A2) be an adversary for the game PubK
cpa
A ,TP(`)
(κ). We will
define an adversary A ′ = (A ′1 ,A
′
2) for PubK
cpa−mult
A ′,HE (κ) that will either simulate
the game PubKcpa
A ,TP(`)
(κ) or PubKcpa
A ,TP(`−1)(κ). Which game is simulated will
depend on some s ∈R {0, 1} that is unknown to A ′ himself. Using the assump-
tion that HE is q-IND-CPA secure, we are able to argue that A ′ is unable to
recognize which of the two schemes was simulated, and this fact allows us to
bound the difference in success probabilities between the security games of TP(`)
and TP(`−1). The structure of this proof is very similar to e.g. Lemma 5.3 in
[BJ15]. The adversary A ′ acts as follows (see also Figure 3):
A ′1 takes care of most of the key generation procedure: he generates the classical
key sets 0 through ` − 1 himself, generates the random strings x0, z0, . . . ,
x`−1, z`−1, and constructs the gadgets γx0,z0(g0), . . . , γx`−1,z`−1(g`−1) and
their classical information g0, . . . , g`−1. He encrypts the classical informa-
tion using the appropriate public keys. Only g`−1, x`−1 and z`−1 are left
unencrypted: instead of encrypting these strings himself using pk `, A
′
1 sends
the strings for encryption to the challenger. Whether the challenger really
encrypts g`−1, x`−1 and z`−1 or replaces the strings with a string of zeros,
determines which of the two schemes is simulated. A ′ is unaware of the
random choice of the challenger.
The adversary A ′1 also generates the extra padding inputs that correspond
to the already-removed gadgets ` up to L − 1. Since these gadgets consist
of all-zero strings encrypted with independently chosen public keys that are
not used anywhere else, together with a completely mixed quantum state (as
shown in Equation 2), the adversary can generate them without needing any
extra information.
A ′2 feeds the evaluation key and public key, just generated by A
′
1 , to A1 in order
to obtain a chosen message M (plus the auxiliary state E). He then picks a
random r ∈R {0, 1} and erasesM if and only if r = 0. He encrypts the result
according to the TP.Enc procedure (using the public key (pk i)
L
i=0 received
from A ′1), and gives the encrypted state, plus E , to A2, who outputs r′ in
an attempt to guess r. A ′2 now outputs 1 if and only if the guess by A was
correct, i.e. r ≡ r′.
Because HE is q-IND-CPA secure, the probability that A ′ wins PubKcpa−multA ′,HE (κ),
i.e. that s′ ≡ s, is at most 12 + η′(κ) for some negligible function η′. There are
two scenarios in which A ′ wins the game:
– s = 1 and A guesses r correctly: If s = 1, the game that is being simulated
is PubKcpa
A ,TP(`)
(κ). If A wins the simulated game (r ≡ r′), then A ′ will
correctly output s′ = 1. (If A loses, then A ′ outputs 0, and loses as well).
– s = 0 and A does not guess r correctly: If s = 0, the game that is being
simulated is PubKcpa
A ,TP(`−1)(κ). If A loses the game (r 6≡ r′), then A ′ will
correctly output s′ = 0. (If A wins, then A ′ outputs 1 and loses).
From the above, we conclude that
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for i = 0 to `− 1 do:
g`−1, x`−1, z`−1
g`−2, x`−2, z`−2
...
g0, x0, z0
⊗`−1
i=0 γxi,zi(gi)
(evk i)
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i=0
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Fig. 3. A strategy for the game PubKcpa−multA ′,HE (κ), using an adversary A for
PubKcpa
A ,TP(`)
(κ) as a subroutine. All the wires that form an input to A1 together
form the evaluation key and public key for TP(`) or TP(`−1), depending on s. Note
that Ξcpa,rTP = Ξ
cpa,r
TP(`)
= Ξcpa,r
TP(`−1) , so A
′
2 can run either one of these independently of s
(i.e. without having to query the challenger). The ‘create padding’ subroutine generates
dummy gadgets for ` up to L− 1, as described in the definition of A1.
Pr[s = 1] · Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(`)
(κ) = 1] + Pr[s = 0] · Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(`−1)(κ) = 0] ≤
1
2
+ η′(κ)
⇔ 1
2
Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(`)
(κ) = 1] +
1
2
(
1− Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(`−1)(κ) = 1]
)
≤ 1
2
+ η′(κ)
⇔ Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(`)
(κ) = 1]− Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(`−1)(κ) = 1] ≤ 2η′(κ)
Set η(κ) := 2η′(κ), and the proof is complete.
By applying Lemma 1 iteratively, L times in total, we can conclude that the
difference between TP(L) and TP(0) is negligible, because the sum of polynomially
many negligible functions is still negligible:
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Corollary 1. If L is polynomial in κ, then for any quantum polynomial-time
adversary A = (A1,A2), there exists a negligible function η such that
Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(L)
(κ) = 1]− Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(0)
(κ) = 1] ≤ η(κ).
Using Corollary 1, we can finally prove the q-IND-CPA security of our scheme
TP = TP(L).
Proof of Theorem 2. The scheme TP(0) is very similar to CL in terms of its key
generation and encryption steps. The evaluation key consists of several classical
evaluation keys, plus some completely mixed states and encryptions of 0 which
we can safely ignore because they do not contain any information about the
encrypted message. In both schemes, the encryption of a qubit is a quantum
one-time pad together with the encrypted keys. The only difference is that in
TP(0), the public key and evaluation key form a tuple containing, in addition to
pk0 and evk0 which are used for the encryption of the quantum one-time pad,
a list of public/evaluation keys that are independent of the encryption. These
keys do not provide any advantage (in fact, the adversary could have generated
them himself by repeatedly running HE.KeyGen(1κ, 1L)). Therefore, we can safely
ignore these keys as well.
In [BJ15, Lemma 5.3], it is shown that CL is q-IND-CPA secure. Because of
the similarity between CL and TP(0), the exact same proof shows that TP(0) is
q-IND-CPA secure as well, that is, for any A there exists a negligible function
η′ such that
Pr[PubKcpa
A ,TP(0)
(κ) = 1] ≤ 1
2
+ η′(κ).
Combining this result with Corollary 1, it follows that
Pr[PubKcpaA ,TP(κ) = 1] ≤ Pr[PubKcpaA ,TP(0)(κ) = 1] + η(κ)
≤ 1
2
+ η′(κ) + η(κ).
Since the sum of two negligible functions is itself negligible, we have proved
Theorem 2.
4.1 Circuit privacy
The scheme TP as presented above ensures the privacy of the input data. It does
not guarantee, however, that whoever generates the keys, encrypts, and decrypts
cannot gain information about the circuit C that was applied to some input ρ by
the evaluator. Obviously, the output value CρC† often reveals something about
the circuit C, but apart from this necessary leakage of information, one may
require a (quantum) homomorphic encryption scheme to ensure circuit privacy
in the sense that an adversary cannot statistically gain any information about C
from the output of the evaluation procedure that it could not already gain from
CρC† itself.
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We claim that circuit privacy for TP in the semi-honest setting (i.e. against
passive adversaries8) can be obtained by modifying the scheme only slightly,
given that the classical encryption scheme has the circuit privacy property.
Theorem 3. If HE has circuit privacy in the semi-honest setting, then TP can
be adapted to a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme with circuit privacy.
Proof sketch. If the evaluator randomizes the encryption of the output data by
applying a quantum one-time pad to the (already encrypted) result of the evalu-
ation, the keys themselves are uniformly random and therefore do not reveal any
information about what circuit was evaluated. The evaluator can then proceed
to update the classical encryptions of those keys accordingly, and by the circuit
privacy of the classical scheme, the resulting encrypted keys will also contain no
information about the computations performed. A more thorough proof is given
in Appendix B.
5 Constructing the gadgets
In this section we will first show how to construct gadgets that have polynomial
size whenever the scheme HE has a decryption circuit with logarithmic depth (i.e.,
the decryption function is in NC1). This construction will already be powerful
enough to instantiate TP with current classical schemes for homomorphic encryp-
tion, since these commonly have low-depth decryption circuits. Afterwards, in
Section 5.2, we will present a larger toolkit to construct gadgets, which is efficient
for a larger class of possible decryption functions. To illustrate these techniques,
we apply these tools to create gadgets for schemes that are based on Learning
With Errors (LWE). Finally, we will reflect on the possibility of constructing
these gadgets in scenarios where quantum power is limited.
5.1 For log-depth decryption circuits
The main tool for creating gadgets that encode log-depth decryption circuits
comes from Barrington’s theorem: a classic result in complexity theory, which
states that all boolean circuits of logarithmic depth can be encoded as polynomial-
sized width-5 permutation branching programs. Every instruction of such a
branching program will be encoded as connections between five Bell pairs.
Definition 3. A width-k permutation branching program of length L on an
input x ∈ {0, 1}n is a list of L instructions of the form 〈i`, σ1` , σ0` 〉, for 1 ≤ ` ≤ L,
such that i` ∈ [n], and σ1` and σ0` are elements of Sk, i.e., permutations of [k].
The program is executed by composing the permutations given by the instructions
1 through L, selecting σ1` if xi` = 1 and selecting σ
0
` if xi` = 0. The program
rejects if this product equals the identity permutation and accepts if it equals a
fixed k-cycle.
8 Note that there various ways to define passive adversaries in the quantum set-
ting [DNS10, BB14]. Here, we are considering adversaries that follow all protocol
instructions exactly.
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Since these programs have a very simple form, it came as a surprise when
they were proven to be quite powerful [Bar89].
Theorem 4 (Barrington [Bar89]). Every fan-in 2 boolean circuit C of depth d
can be simulated by a width-5 permutation branching program of length at most 4d.
Our gadget construction will consist of first transforming the decryption
function HE.Dec into a permutation branching program, and then encoding this
permutation branching program as a specification of a gadget, as produced by
TP.GenGadgetpk ′(sk), and usage instructions TP.GenMeasurement(a˜).
Theorem 5. Let HE.Decsk (a˜) be the decryption function of the classical homo-
morphic encryption scheme HE. If HE.Dec is computable by a boolean fan-in 2
circuit of depth O(log(κ)), where κ is the security parameter, then there exist
gadgets for TP of size polynomial in κ.
Proof. Our description will consist of three steps. First, we write HE.Dec as a
width-5 permutation branching program, of which the instructions alternately
depend on the secret key sk and on the ciphertext a˜. Secondly, we specify how
to transform these instructions into a gadget which almost works correctly, but
for which the qubit ends up at an unknown location. Finally, we complete the
construction by executing the inverse program, so that the qubit ends up at a
known location.
The first part follows directly from Barrington’s theorem. The effective input
of HE.Dec can be seen as the concatenation of the secret key sk and the ciphertext
a˜. Since by assumption the circuit is of depth O(log κ), there exists width-5 per-
mutation branching program P of length L = κO(1), with the following properties.
We write
P = (〈i1, σ11 , σ01〉, 〈i2, σ12 , σ02〉, . . . , 〈iL, σ1L, σ0L〉)
as the list of instructions of the width-5 permutation branching program. Without
loss of generality9, we can assume that the instructions alternately depend on
bits of a˜ and bits of sk . That is, the index i` refers to a bit of a˜ if ` is odd, and
to a bit of sk if ` is even. There are L instructions in total, of which L/2 are
odd-numbered and L/2 are even.
The output of TP.GenGadgetpk ′(sk), i.e., the list of pairs that defines the
structure of the gadget, will be created from the even-numbered instructions,
evaluated using the secret key sk . For every even-numbered ` ≤ L, we connect
ten qubits in the following way. Suppose the `th instruction evaluates to some
permutation σ` := σ
ski`
` . Label the 10 qubits of this part of the gadget by
1`,in, 2`,in, . . . , 5`,in and 1`,out, 2`,out, . . . , 5`,out. These will correspond to 5 EPR
pairs, connected according to the permutation: (1`,in, σ`(1)`,out), (2`,in, σ`(2)`,out),
etc., up to (5`,in, σ`(5)`,out).
9 This can be seen by inserting dummy instructions that always perform the identity
permutation between any two consecutive instructions that depend on the same vari-
able. Alternatively, it would be possible to improve the construction by ‘multiplying
out’ consecutive instructions whenever they depend on the same variable.
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After the final instruction of the branching program, σL, also perform an
inverse phase gate P† on the qubits labeled as 2L,out, 3L,out, 4L,out, 5L,out. Ex-
ecution of the gadget will teleport the qubit through one of these whenever
a˜ = 1.
For this construction, TP.GenMeasurement(a˜) will be given by the odd in-
structions, which depend on the bits of a˜. Again, for all odd ` ≤ L, let σ` := σa˜i``
be the permutation given by the evaluation of instruction ` on a˜. For all `
strictly greater than one, the measurement instructions will be: perform a Bell
measurement according to the permutation σ` between the ‘out’ qubits of the
previous set, and the ‘in’ qubits of the next. The measurement pairs will then be
(1`−1,out, σ(1)`,in), (2`−1,out, σ(2)`,in), up to (5`−1,out, σ(5)`,in).
For ` = 1, there is no previous layer to connect to, only the input qubit. For
that, we add the measurement instruction (0, σ(1)1,in), where 0 is the label of
the input qubit.
By Barrington’s theorem, if HE.Decsk (a˜) = 0 then the product, say τ , of the
permutations coming from the evaluated instructions equals the identity. In that
case, consecutively applying these permutations on ‘1’, results in the unchanged
starting value, ‘1’. If instead the decryption would output 1, the consecutive
application results in another value in {2, 3, 4, 5}, because in that case, τ is a
k-cycle. After teleporting a qubit through these EPR pairs, with teleportation
measurements chosen accordingly, the input qubit will be present at τ(1)L,out,
with an inverse phase gate if τ(1) is unequal to 1.
The gadget constructed so far would correctly apply the phase gate, condi-
tioned on HE.Decsk (a˜), with one problem: afterward, the qubit is at a location
unknown to the user of the gadget, because the user cannot compute τ .
We fix this problem in the following way: execute the inverse branching
program afterwards. The entire construction is continued in the same way, but
the instructions of the inverse program are used. The inverse program can be
made from the original program by reversing the order of instructions, and then
for each permutation using its inverse permutation instead. The first inverse
instruction is 〈iL, (σ1L)−1, (σ0L)−1〉, then 〈iL−1, (σ1L−1)−1, (σ0L−1)−1〉, with final
instruction 〈i1, (σ11)−1, (σ01)−1〉. One small detail is that iL is used twice in a
row, breaking the alternation; the user of the gadget can simply perform the
measurements that correspond to the identity permutation e in between, since
(σ0L)(σ
0
L)
−1 = (σ1L)(σ
1
L)
−1 = e.
After having repeated the construction with the inverse permutation branch-
ing program, the qubit is guaranteed to be at the location where it originally
started: σ1(1) of the final layer of five qubits – that will then be the corrected
qubit which is the output of the gadget.
The total number of qubits which form the gadget, created from a width-5
permutation branching program of length L, of which the instructions alternate
between depending on a˜ and depending on sk , is 2 · (5L) = 10L.
Example. The OR function on two bits can be computed using a width-5 permuta-
tion branching program of length 4, consisting of the following list of instructions:
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P†
P†
P†
P†
〈a˜1, e, (12345)〉 〈sk1, e, (12453)〉 〈a˜1, e, (54321)〉 〈sk1, (14235), (15243)〉
Fig. 4. Structure of the (first half of the) gadget, with measurements, coming from the
5-permutation branching program for the OR function on the input (0, 0). The example
program’s instructions are displayed above the permutations. The solid lines correspond
to Bell measurements, while the wavy lines represent EPR pairs.
1. 〈1, e, (12345)〉
2. 〈2, e, (12453)〉
3. 〈1, e, (54321)〉
4. 〈2, (14235), (15243)〉
As a simplified example, suppose the decryption function HE.Decsk (a˜) is sk1OR a˜1.
Then, for one possible example set of values of a˜ and sk , half of the gadget and
measurements will be as given in Figure 4. To complete this gadget, the same
construction is appended, reflected horizontally.
5.2 For log-space computable decryption functions
Even though the construction based on Barrington’s theorem has enough power
for current classical homomorphic schemes, it is possible to improve on this con-
struction in two directions. Firstly, we extend our result to be able to handle
a larger class of decryption functions: those that can be computed in logarith-
mic space, instead of only NC1. Secondly, for some specific decryption functions,
executing the construction of Section 5.1 might produce significantly larger gad-
gets than necessary. For instance, even for very simple circuits of depth log κ,
Barrington’s theorem produces programs of length κ2 — a direct approach can
often easily improve on the exponent of the polynomial. See also the garden-hose
protocols for equality [Mar14, CSWX14] and the majority function [KP14] for
examples of non-trivial protocols that are much more efficient than applying
Barrington’s theorem as a black box.
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In Appendix C we describe a construction for log-space computation in depth.
The explanation in the appendix uses a different language than the direct encod-
ing of the previous section: there is a natural way of writing the requirements on
the gadgets as a two-player task, and then writing strategies for this task in the
garden-hose model.
Theorem 6. Let HE.Decsk (a˜) be the decryption function of the classical homo-
morphic encryption scheme HE. If HE.Dec is computable by a Turing machine
that uses space O(log κ), where κ is the security parameter, then there exist
gadgets for TP of size polynomial in κ.
Writing these gadgets in terms of the garden-hose model, even though it adds
a layer of complexity to the construction, gives more insight into the structure
of the gadgets, and forms its original inspiration. We therefore sketch the link
between log-space computation and gadget construction within this framework.
Viewing the gadget construction as instance of the garden-hose model, besides
clarifying the log-space construction, also makes it easier to construct gadgets
for specific cases. Earlier work developed protocols in the garden-hose model
for several functions, see for instance [Spe11, BFSS13, KP14], and connections
to other models of computation. These results on the garden-hose model might
serve as building blocks to create more efficient gadgets for specific decoding
functions of classical homomorphic schemes, that are potentially much smaller
than those created as a result of following the general constructions of Theorem 5
or 6.
5.3 Specific case: Learning With Errors
The scheme by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [BV11] is well-suited for our con-
struction, and its decryption function is representative for a much wider class of
schemes which are based on the hardness of Learning With Errors (LWE). As an
example, we construct gadgets that enable quantum homomorphic encryption
based on the BV11 scheme. Let κ be the security parameter, and let p be the
modulus of the integer ring over which the scheme operates.
The ciphertext c is given by a pair ((v), w), with (v) ∈ Zκp and w ∈ Zp.
The secret key s is an element of Zkp. The decryption of a message m involves
computation of an inner product over the ring Zp,
m = (w − 〈v, s〉) (mod p) (mod 2) . (3)
The BV11 scheme is able to make the modulus small, i.e. polynomial in κ,
before encryption. In Appendix D we present an explicit construction for the
case of small modulus p, which can be illustrative to read as example of our
construction, and an implicit construction for more complicated gadgets for the
case of superpolynomial p.
Proposition 1. The decryption function of the BV11 scheme translates into
polynomial-sized gadgets.
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5.4 Constructing gadgets using limited quantum resources
In a setting where a less powerful client wants to delegate some quantum compu-
tation to a more powerful server, it is important to minimize the amount of effort
required from the client. In delegated quantum computation, the complexity of
a protocol can be measured by, among other things, the total amount of com-
munication between client and server, the number of rounds of communication,
and the quantum resources available to the client, such as possible quantum
operations and memory size.
We claim that TP gives rise to a three-round delegated quantum computation
protocol in a setting where the client can perform only Pauli and swap operations.
TP.Enc and TP.Dec only require local application of Pauli operators to a quan-
tum state, but TP.KeyGen is more involved because of the gadget construction.
However, when supplied with a set of EPR pairs from the server (or any other
untrusted source), the client can generate the quantum evaluation key for TP
using only Pauli and swap operations. Even if the server produces some other
state than the claimed list of EPR pairs, the client can prevent the leakage of in-
formation about her input by encrypting the input with random Pauli operations.
More details are supplied in Appendix E.
Alternatively, TP can be regarded as a two-round delegated quantum com-
putation protocol in a setting where the client can perform arbitrary Clifford
operations, but is limited to a constant-sized quantum memory, given that HE.Dec
is in NC1. In that case, the gadgets can be constructed ten qubits at a time, by
constructing the sets of five EPR pairs as specified in Section 5.1. By decomposing
the 5-cycles into products of 2-cycles, the quantum memory can even be reduced
to only four qubits. The client sends these small parts of the gadgets to the server
as they are completed. Because communication remains one-way until all gadgets
have been sent, this can be regarded as a single round of communication.
6 Conclusion
We have presented the first quantum homomorphic encryption scheme TP that is
compact and allows evaluation of circuits with polynomially many T gates in the
security parameter, i.e. arbitrary polynomial-sized circuits. Assuming that the
number of wires involved in the evaluation circuit is also polynomially related to
the security parameter, we may consider TP to be leveled fully homomorphic. The
scheme is based on an arbitrary classical FHE scheme, and any computational
assumptions needed for the classical scheme are also required for security of TP.
However, since TP uses the classical FHE scheme as a black box, any FHE scheme
can be plugged in to change the set of computational assumptions.
Our constructions are based on a new and interesting connection between the
area of instantaneous non-local quantum computation and quantum homomor-
phic encryption. Recent techniques developed by Speelman [Spe15], based on the
garden-hose model [BFSS13], have turned out to be crucial for our construction
of quantum gadgets which allow homomorphic evaluation of T gates on encrypted
quantum data.
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6.1 Future work
Since Yu, Pe´rez-Delgado and Fitzsimons [YPDF14] showed that information-
theoretically secure QFHE is impossible (at least in the exact case), it is natural
to wonder whether it is possible to construct a non-leveled QFHE scheme based
on computational assumptions. If such a scheme is not possible, can one find
lower bounds on the size of the evaluation key of a compact scheme? Other
than the development of more efficient QFHE schemes, one can consider the
construction of QFHE schemes with extra properties, such as circuit privacy
against active adversaries. It is also interesting to look at other cryptographic
tasks that might be executed using QFHE. In the classical world for example,
multiparty computation protocols can be constructed from fully homomorphic
encryption [CDN01]. We consider it likely that our new techniques will also be
useful in other contexts such as quantum indistinguishability obfuscation [AF16].
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A Key update rules
A.1 Applying Clifford group gates
For convenience, we repeat the key update rules when applying the generators of
the Clifford group to a state that is encrypted with the quantum one-time pad.
These can be found in many places in the literature (or can be easily calculated
by hand), see also e.g. [BJ15, Appendix C].
After applying a gate to the ith wire of a quantum state that has one-time
pad keys ai and bi, we update the keys as
Pi : (ai, bi)→ (ai, ai ⊕ bi)
and
Hi : (ai, bi)→ (bi, ai) .
For the two-qubit CNOT gate applied on control wire i, with target j, we
update the corresponding keys as
CNOTi,j : (ai, bi; aj , bj)→ (ai, bi ⊕ bj ; ai ⊕ aj , bj) .
A.2 Using the gadget
After using the gadget, but before updating any classical information, the eval-
uator has: the encrypted one-time pad keys a˜, b˜, a list of m pairs for Bell mea-
surements M ← TP.GenMeasurement(a˜) and a list of outcomes for each of these
m measurements, say c, d ∈ {0, 1}m.
The evaluator also has encrypted versions of {(s1, t1), (s2, t2), . . . , (sm, tm)},
p ∈ {0, 1}m, and x, z ∈ {0, 1}m that specify the structure of the gadget.
Say an arbitrary qubit10 was teleported through the gadget, so that the qubit
started in some state PaXaZb|ψ〉 and is currently in state Xa′Zb′ |ψ〉. We sketch
the algorithm an evaluator would execute on this encrypted state, to compute
(encrypted versions of) the updated keys a′ and b′. Updating the keys is not
complicated, it mostly involves bookkeeping to keep track of the current location
of the qubit, and its current X-correction, Z-correction and phase.
We explain the calculation as if performed with the unencrypted versions; in
the actual execution, only the encrypted versions of all variables are used, and
this entire calculation is performed homomorphically. Since all the mentioned
classical information either is or can be encrypted with the same public key, this
calculation can be handled by the classical homomorphic scheme HE.
The algorithm tracks the path the qubit takes through the gadget, by re-
solving the teleportations that involve the qubit one by one. Even though the
measurements were all performed at the same time, we will describe them as if
ordered in this manner. All additions of the keys of the one-time pad will be
performed modulo 2, since X2 = Z2 = I.
10 The input qubit is not necessarily a pure state, but we write an arbitrary pure state
without loss of generality, to simplify notation.
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Let a,b be variables that hold the current key to the one-time pad at every
step of the algorithm. We initialize these as a ← a and b ← b. Let q be a
variable that stores whether or not the qubit currently has an extra phase gate,
initialized as q ← a. Let r be the variable that contains the current location
of the qubit, with possible locations 0 to 2m, initialized to 0. That is, we view
the current state as being PqXaZb|ψ〉 at location r. For every step we update
the location depending on M and {(s1, t1), (s2, t2), . . . , (sm, tm)}, and update the
keys depending on the corresponding measurement outcomes.
First, find the pair in M that contains the current location r, say pair i which
consists of (r, s) for some other location s. The outcome of this measurement is
given by c[i] and d[i]. Effectively, these outcomes change the current state to
Xc[i]Zd[i]PqXaZb|ψ〉 = PqXa+c[i]Zb+d[i]+q·c[i]|ψ〉 ,
therefore we update a ← a + c[i] and b ← b + d[i] + q · c[i]. Note that the
key update rules also involve multiplication – an extra Z gate is added if the
phase gate was present, q = 1, and the teleportation measurement required an
X correction, c[i] = 1.
Next, find the pair in {(s1, t1), (s2, t2), . . . , (sm, tm)} that contains the new
location s, say pair j containing (s, t). The teleportation of the qubit through
this pair effectively applies Xx[j]Zz[j](P†)p[j] to the state. Then, if we already use
the updated a and b, the quantum state at this step equals
Xx[j]Zz[j](P†)p[j]PqXaZb|ψ〉 = Xx[j]Zz[j]Pp[j]PqXaZb+p[j]|ψ〉
= Pp[j]+q (mod 2)Xa+x[j]Zb+z[j]+p[j]·(1+q)+x[j]·(p[j]+q)|ψ〉 .
For rewriting, we used the fact that P2 = Z and that P† = PZ, together with
the commutation relations from the previous section. We therefore update the
phase q← p[j] + q (mod 2), and the components of the quantum one-time pad
to a← a + x[j] and b← b + z[j] + p[j] · (1 + q[j]) + x[j] · (p[j] + q[j]). Finally,
set the new location of the qubit r← t.
The previous two steps are then repeated m times, where 2m is the size of the
gadget, to eventually (homomorphically) compute the new updated keys a′,b′ to
the quantum one-time pad. Afterwards, all temporary variables can be discarded,
and only the updated keys will be needed for continuining the protocol.
B Circuit privacy
In this appendix, we demonstrate that with only a slight modification of TP,
the scheme has circuit privacy in the semi-honest setting, i.e. against passive
adversaries. Classically, circuit privacy is defined by requiring the existence of
a simulator SimHE whose inputs are the public parameters and C(x) and which
produces an output which is indistinguishable from the homomorphic evaluation
of C on the encryption of x. Formally, circuit privacy is defined as follows.
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Definition 4 (Classical circuit privacy – semi-honest setting [IP07]).
A classical homomorphic encryption scheme HE has statistical circuit privacy
in the semi-honest (‘honest-but-curious’) model if there exists a PPT algorithm
SimHE and a negligible function η such that for any security parameter κ, input
x, key set (pk , evk , sk)← HE.KeyGen(1κ), and circuit C:
δ(HE.EvalCevk (HE.Encpk(x)),SimHE(1
κ, pk , evk ,C(x))) ≤ η(κ)
Here, δ(X,Y ) := 12
∑
u∈U
∣∣Pr[X = u]− Pr[Y = u]∣∣ is the statistical distance
between two random variables over a finite universe U . For notational convenience,
we will often write SimHE(C(x)) if the rest of the arguments are clear from the
context. Also we will sometimes write X ≈a Y to denote that δ(X,Y ) ≤ a.
If the recryption functionality Reci→j is defined as the composition of the
procedures HE.EvalHE.Decievkj and HE.Encpkj , as in Section 2.2, then recryptions do
not degrade the privacy of the computation: a homomorphic evaluation of some
function with key switching is statistically close to running the simulator directly
on the function output using only the last key set.
Lemma 2. Suppose HE has statistical circuit privacy in the semi-honest setting,
and let SimHE and η be as in Definition 4. Then for any security parameter κ,
L polynomial in κ, list of circuits C1, ...,CL and list of keysets (pk i, evk i, sk i)
L
i=1
generated by HE.KeyGen(1κ), and input x, the statistical distance between
HE.EvalCLevkL(HE.Rec(L−1)→L(HE.Eval
CL−1
evkL−1(· · ·HE.EvalC1evk1(HE.Encpk1(x))))
and
SimHE(1
κ, pkL, evkL,CL(CL−1(· · ·C1(x))))
is negligible in κ.
Proof. Since HE.Rec(L−1)→L = HE.Eval
HE.DecskL−1
evkL
◦ HE.EncpkL by definition, we
have that
HE.EvalCLevkL(HE.Rec(L−1)→L(HE.Eval
CL−1
evkL−1(· · ·HE.EvalC1evk1(HE.Encpk1(x))))
= HE.Eval
CL◦HE.DecskL−1
evkL
(HE.EncpkL(HE.Eval
CL−1
evkL−1(· · ·HE.EvalC1evk1(HE.Encpk1(x))))
≈η(κ) SimHE(1κ, pkL, evkL,CL(HE.DecskL−1(HE.EvalCL−1evkL−1(· · ·HE.EvalC1evk1(HE.Encpk1(x))))))
which, by correctness of HE, is statistically indistinguishable from
SimHE(1
κ, pkL, evkL,CL(CL−1(CL−2(· · ·C1(x)))))
as long as L is polynomial in κ. By triangle inequality, the statement of the
lemma follows.
In the quantum setting, we need to take into account the fact that the input
state may be part of some larger (possibly entangled) system. This leads to the
following definition of quantum circuit privacy in the semi-honest setting:
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Definition 5 (Quantum circuit privacy – semi-honest setting). A quan-
tum homomorphic encryption scheme QHE has statistical circuit privacy in the
semi-honest setting if there exists a quantum PPT algorithm SimQHE and a neg-
ligible function η such that for any security parameter κ, depth parameter L, key
set (pk , ρevk , sk) ← QHE.KeyGen(1κ, 1L), state σ, and circuit C with up to L
T-gates: ∥∥∥(ΦC,ρevk ,pkQHE.Eval ◦ ΦpkQHE.Enc)− (Φρevk ,pkSimQHE ◦ ΦC)∥∥∥♦ ≤ η(κ)
In this definition, ΦU denotes the quantum channel induced by the circuit or
functionality U. The diamond norm ‖ΦU‖♦ is defined in terms of the trace norm:
‖ΦU‖♦ := maxσ‖(ΦU ⊗ I)σ‖1 where the maximisation is over input states σ.
We now show that the scheme TP can, with very little overhead, be modified
to provide circuit privacy, as stated in Theorem 3 from Section 4.1:
Theorem 3. If HE has circuit privacy in the semi-honest setting, then TP can
be adapted to a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme with circuit privacy.
Proof. We make the following alteration to the scheme TP: at the end of the
evaluation procedure, the evaluator applies a (random) quantum one-time pad
to the output of the evaluation, and updates the classical encryptions of the keys
accordingly. The rest of the scheme remains exactly the same, and it is clear that
this altered version of TP is still compact and correct.
Intuitively, the randomization step at the end of the evaluation phase com-
pletely hides the circuit: the keys to the quantum one-time pads themselves are
now entirely independent of the circuit, and circuit privacy of HE will ensure that
even the classical encryption of these keys does not reveal any information about
the computations performed on them.
To formalize this intuition, we define a quantum algorithm SimTP satisfying
the constraints given in Definition 5. Let SimHE be the classical simulator guaran-
teed to exist by the classical circuit privacy of HE (see Definition 4). Given some
security parameter κ, some keys pk = (pk1, ..., pkL) and evk = (evk1, ..., evkL),
and some quantum state σ, let SimTP apply a uniformly random quantum one-
time pad to σ, and apply SimHE(1
κ, pkL, evkL, ·) to the pad keys. The resulting
classical-quantum state is the output of SimTP. This algorithm resembles TP.Enc,
but instead of calling HE.Enc (with pk1) as a subroutine, it handles the pad key
information using the classical simulator SimHE (with pkL).
If we can show that the trace distance∥∥∥((ΦC,ρevk ,pkTP.Eval ◦ ΦpkTP.Enc)⊗ I)σ − ((Φρevk ,pkSimTP ◦ ΦC)⊗ I)σ∥∥∥1
is negligible for any quantum state σ of an appropriate dimension, then quantum
circuit privacy of TP immediately follows from Defintion 5 and the definition of
the diamond norm.
Write σsim :=
(
(Φρevk ,pkSimTP ◦ ΦC)⊗ I
)
σ, and σeval :=
((
ΦC,ρevk ,pkTP.Eval ◦ ΦpkTP.Enc
)
⊗ I
)
σ.
We study the state σsim in more detail, and show how to transform it into σeval
in only a few (negligible) steps. As a result, the trace distance of these two states
will be negligible.
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By definition of the algorithm SimTP, the state σsim is equal to
1
22n
∑
x,z∈{0,1}n
( n⊗
i=1
ρ
(
SimHE(1
κ, pkL, evkL, x[i])
)⊗ n⊗
i=1
ρ
(
SimHE(1
κ, pkL, evkL, z[i])
)⊗
((
n⊗
i=1
Xx[i]Zz[i]C⊗ I
)
σ
(
C†
n⊗
i=1
Xx[i]Zz[i] ⊗ I
)))
.
During the evaluation procedure of TP, the evaluator updates the keys to the
quantum one-time pad for all n qubits in the circuit. These updates depend on
the circuit that is being evaluated, some randomness r from the Bell measurement
outcomes11 and of course on the initial one-time pad keys. Let fC,ri (a, b) denote
the X key on the ith qubit after the evaluation of some circuit C with randomness r,
with a, b ∈ {0, 1}n the initial pad keys before the evaluation procedure. Similarly,
let gC,ri (a, b) denote the Z key for that qubit.
At the end of the evaluation phase, the evaluator chooses bit strings x and
z uniformly at random, so the final keys fC,ri (a, b)⊕ x[i] and gC,ri (a, b)⊕ z[i] are
themselves completely uniform for any a, b. Therefore, the state σsim is actually
equal to
1
24n
∑
a,b,x,z∈{0,1}n
r∈{0,1}∗
Pr
R
(r)
( n⊗
i=1
ρ
(
SimHE(1
κ, pkL, evkL, f
C,r
i (a, b)⊕ x[i])
)⊗
n⊗
i=1
ρ
(
SimHE(1
κ, pkL, evkL, g
C,r
i (a, b)⊕ z[i])
)⊗((
n⊗
i=1
Xf
C,r
i (a,b)⊕x[i]Zg
C,r
i (a,b)⊕z[i]C⊗ I
)
σ
(
C†
n⊗
i=1
Xf
C,r
i (a,b)⊕x[i]Zg
C,r
i (a,b)⊕z[i] ⊗ I
)))
.
This is where the classical circuit privacy property kicks in: for any fixed i, a, b,C, r, x,
the result of the probabilistic computation SimHE(f
C,r
i (a, b)⊕x[i]) is statistically
indistinguishable from the evaluation of the function fC,ri (·, ·)⊕x[i] on the encryp-
tions of a and b. Note however that the evaluation of fC,ri is performed in several
steps, with key switching in between. That is, separate functions h1 through hL
are evaluated in each key set 1 through L, such that fC,ri = hL ◦ · · · ◦ h1. We ab-
stract away from the exact way that the function fC,ri is broken up into these sep-
arate functions h1, ..., hL, and simply write HE.Eval
fC,ri (·,·)⊕x[i]
1,...,L (HE.Encpk1(a, b))
11 Although for the scheme TP, the measurement outcomes will in principle be uni-
formly distributed, we will not make this assumption here. In case of a malicious key
generator, measurement outcomes might be correlated in some way. Therefore, we
will simply assume that r is distributed according to some distribution R.
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to denote
HE.Eval
(·⊕x[i])◦hL
evkL
(HE.Rec(L−1)→L(HE.Eval
hL−1
evkL−1(· · ·HE.Evalh1evk1(HE.Encpk1(a, b)))).
By Lemma 2, it follows that
δ
(
HE.Eval
fC,ri (·,·)⊕x[i]
1,...,L (HE.Encpk1(a, b)),SimHE(1
κ, pkL, evkL, f
C,r
i (a, b)⊕ x[i])
)
≤ η(κ)
for some negligible function η. We can rewrite this equation in terms of the trace
distance to get
∥∥∥∥(HE.EvalfC,ri (·,·)⊕x[i]1,...,L (HE.Encpk1(a, b))− SimHE(1κ, pkL, evkL, fC,ri (a, b)⊕ x[i])∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2η(κ)
A similar result holds for gC,ri (·, ·)⊕ z[i]. Using subadditivity of the trace norm
with respect to the tensor product, it follows that the trace distance between
σsim and
1
24n
∑
a,b,x,z∈{0,1}n
r∈{0,1}∗
Pr
R
(r)
( n⊗
i=1
ρ
(
HE.Eval
fC,ri ⊕x[i]
1,...,L (HE.Encpk1(a, b))
)⊗
n⊗
i=1
ρ
(
HE.Eval
gC,ri ⊕z[i]
1,...,L (HE.Encpk1(a, b))
)⊗((
n⊗
i=1
Xf
C,r
i (a,b)⊕x[i]Zg
C,r
i (a,b)⊕z[i]C⊗ I
)
σ
(
C†
n⊗
i=1
Xf
C,r
i (a,b)⊕x[i]Zg
C,r
i (a,b)⊕z[i] ⊗ I
)))
is at most 4n ·η(κ). Note that this last state is exactly σeval, the result of putting
σ through the channel (ΦC,ρevk ,pkTP.Eval ◦ ΦpkTP.Enc)⊗ I. We conclude that for any σ,
‖σeval − σsim‖1 ≤ 4n · η(κ)
for some negligible function η that does not depend on σ. Hence,∥∥∥(ΦC,ρevk ,pkTP.Eval ◦ ΦpkTP.Enc)− (Φρevk ,pkSimTP ◦ ΦC)∥∥∥♦ =
max
σ
∥∥∥((ΦC,ρevk ,pkTP.Eval ◦ ΦpkTP.Enc)⊗ I)σ − ((Φρevk ,pkSimTP ◦ ΦC)⊗ I)σ∥∥∥1 ≤ 4n · η(κ)
which is negligible if η is negligible.
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C Gadget construction using the garden-hose model
To construct the gadgets for specific decryption functions HE.Dec, we will consider
a purified version of the construction of the gadget state.
Consider the following task among two parties Alice and Bob. Alice corre-
sponds to the party which creates the gadget, so she has knowledge of the secret
key sk . Bob corresponds to the party which uses the gadget, therefore Bob has
some input a˜ and a state Pa|ψ〉, where a = HE.Decsk (a˜). The end goal of the task
is for Bob to possess the state Xa
′
Zb
′ |ψ〉 for some a′,b′ that are computable from
classical information known to Alice and Bob. The players pre-share a number of
EPR pairs between them, and are only allowed to perform their actions without
receiving any communication from the other player. We only consider strategies
where the players perform Bell measurements and inverse phase gates on their
local halves of the given EPR pairs (and in Bob’s case also on the input qubit).
Before presenting strategies for this task, we first describe how this task
translates to the creation of a gadget. Say Alice and Bob share 2m EPR pairs
between them (i.e. they start with 4m qubits in total). Alice will perform Bell
measurements between the halves of EPR pairs on her side, where the choices
she makes depend on sk . Since both players act before receiving any information
from the other player, the actions of Alice and Bob are not ordered – we first
consider how to describe the state when Alice has acted on her local half. If Alice
measures between, say, qubits s and t, with a two-bit outcome that describes
the X and Z corrections, then we can instantly describe the qubits s and t on
Bob’s side as forming a fully entangled state – this teleportation of EPR halves
is sometimes called entanglement swapping. Which out of the four Bell states is
formed depends on the outcomes of Alice’s measurement.
We also allow Alice to perform a P† gate on some qubits before teleportations.
Note that if Alice measures on the qubits given by {(s1, t1), (s2, t2), . . . , (sm, tm)},
after applying an inverse phase gate when specified by the bit-string p, the state
on Bob’s side will exactly have the form of γx,z
(
g(sk)
)
, for some random binary
strings x, z that correspond to the outcomes of Alice’s Bell measurements. The
quantum part of the gadget will be given by the reduced state on Bob’s side,
while the measurement choices and outcomes of Alice will form the accompanying
classical information. The pairs that Bob chooses to perform Bell measurements
on, which only depend on the encrypted information, are exactly the output of
the function TP.GenMeasurement.
An upper bound to the hardness of this task is given by the garden-hose
complexity HE.Dec, written GH (HE.Dec), which is the least number of pipes
needed for the players to compute it in the garden-hose model described in
Section 2.3. This complexity measure is the main measure of hardness in the
garden-hose model, and is relevant for the size of the gadgets in our construction.
The amount of space a Turing machine needs to compute any function f
is closely related to it garden-hose complexity GH (f). The following theorem,
proven in [BFSS13], provides us with a general way of transforming space-efficient
algorithms into garden-hose protocols.
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Theorem 7. [BFSS13, Theorem 2.12] If f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is log-
space computable, then GH (f) is polynomial in n.
Since the garden-hose complexity is defined in a non-uniform way, the strate-
gies of the players are not necessarily easily computable. However, by inspection
of the original proof, we see that the players effectively have to list all configura-
tions for the Turing machine for f , and connect them according to the machine’s
transition function. For a log-space decryption function HE.Dec, a player therefore
only has to perform a polynomial-time computation to determine the strategy
for a specific input.
The general construction is a direct consequence of the following lemma12,
which was recently derived in the context of instantaneous non-local quantum
computation.
Lemma 3. [Spe15, Lemma 8, paraphrased] Assume Bob has a single qubit with
state Pf(x,y)|ψ〉, for binary strings x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, where Alice knows the string x
and Bob knows y. Let GH (f) be the garden-hose complexity of the function f .
Then the following holds:
1. There exists an instantaneous protocol without any communication which
uses 2GH (f) pre-shared EPR pairs after which a known qubit of Bob is in
the state Xg(xˆ,yˆ)Yh(xˆ,yˆ)|ψ〉. Here xˆ depends only on x and the measurement
outcomes of Alice, and yˆ depends on y and the measurement outcomes of
Bob.
2. The garden-hose complexities of the functions g and h are at most linear in
the complexity of the function f .
For our purposes, only the first part of this result is required. The construction
used in this lemma is a direct application of the garden-hose model [BFSS13],
together with a simplifying step which was inspired by results on the garden-hose
model by Klauck and Podder [KP14]. In our case, the function f will be the
decryption function HE.Dec where Alice holds sk , and Bob holds a˜.
C.1 Toy example
The garden-hose protocols that correspond to actual decryption functions will
quickly become complicated in their description. Therefore, as an illustrative
example, we will explicitly show how to convert a garden-hose protocol for the
decryption function of a toy classical scheme TOY to a gadget. We do not claim
TOY to be homomorphic at all; we only define its very simple decryption function
and leave the rest of the scheme undefined.
Consider the following definition of TOY.Dec on ciphertext c and key sk of a
single bit:
TOY.Decsk (c) = sk ⊕ c .
12 The names of Alice and Bob have been swapped in order to fit the framework of this
paper.
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In Figure 5, a garden-hose protocol [BFSS13] for TOY.Dec is shown. For the
protocol, Alice and Bob share three EPR-pairs which they use to teleport some
qubit through, in a way that depends only on their own inputs c (for Bob) and
sk (for Alice). The qubit always starts in the location marked ‘in’. After the
execution of the protocol, the qubit |ψ〉 should end up on Bob’s side whenever
TOY.Decsk (c) = 0, and on Alice’s side otherwise. For this small function, correct-
ness is easily verified to hold for all possible inputs.
The garden-hose complexity GH (TOY.Dec) is the minimum amount of EPR-
pairs needed for the computation of TOY.Dec in this way. See also [BFSS13].
in
c
0 1
sk
0 1
Bob Alice
Fig. 5. Garden-hose protocol for TOY.Dec. The snaky lines represent the EPR-pairs
that form the resources to the protocol. The bended lines represent Bell measurements
that Bob and Alice perform dependent on their inputs. For example, if c = 0 and sk = 0,
the qubit starting at ‘in’ is teleported through the first EPR-pair by Bob, then back
through the third EPR-pair by Alice. It comes out on the bottom location on Bob’s
side.
Suppose that Bob teleports some qubit PaXaZb|ψ〉 through the protocol, and
sets his input c to be a˜. Then whenever a = TOY.Decsk (a˜) = 1, the qubit
will come out on Alice’s side, and we will want to apply the correction P†. To
make sure that the correction is applied to PaXaZb|ψ〉, Alice can apply a P†
gate on all possible locations of the qubit. However, after this step, Alice and
Bob do not know the location of the qubit (unless they share their inputs with
one another non-homomorphically). The construction from [Spe15, Lemma 8]
solves this problem by applying the entire garden-hose protocol again in reverse:
every EPR-half on which no measurement is performed, is connected through
measurement with the EPR-half at the same position in the second copy of the
protocol. That way, the (corrected) qubit follows the same path backwards, and
40
always ends up on Bob’s side at the ‘in’ position of the second protocol (marked
‘out’ in Figure 6).
in
c
0 1
sk
0 1
out
P†
P†
Bob Alice
Fig. 6. Removal of a possible P error using two copies of the garden-hose protocol for
TOY.Dec. For example, if c = 0 and sk = 1, the qubit is teleported through EPR pairs
1 and 4, with a P† applied to it by Alice in between. The input qubit always ends up
on position ‘out’.
After the execution of the protocol, the potential P error on the qubit PaXaZb|ψ〉
has been removed, but additional Pauli transformations also have occurred as a
result of the teleportations. The exact transformations depend on both the path
the qubit has taken and the measurement outcomes of Alice and Bob. Therefore,
Alice has to send all of this information (homomorphically encrypted) to Bob,
so that he can update his keys to reflect the new state Xa
′
Zb
′ |ψ〉 of the qubit.
Since the order of the Bell measurements does not influence the outcome
of the protocol, Alice can perform her part of the protocol already during the
key-generation phase. She starts by generating enough EPR-pairs for the gadget
(six in this example), and performs the measurement on her own halves of the
EPR-pairs. Effectively, this action generates six qubits that are entangled in some
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way that depends on sk (see Figure 7). Because of the random Pauli’s that arise
from the Bell measurements, Bob is not able to tell which pairs are connected
without knowing Alice’s measurement outcomes. To him, the state of the gadget
is completely mixed (see Equation 2).
sk = 0 sk = 1
P†
P†
Fig. 7. The two possible gadgets Γ (sk) that TP.GenGadget might generate for TOY.Dec.
Effectively, a gadget consists of 2GH (TOY.Dec) EPR-pairs, ordered in a way that
depends on sk . Some EPR-pairs have an additional (P† ⊗ I) transformation applied to
them. The evaluator’s input c determines whether or not the input qubit is teleported
through such a transformation, but an evaluator is unable to tell whether it is.
D Gadget construction for Learning With Errors
Small modulus. Take the modulus p to be polynomial in κ. We describe a
series of small ‘permutation gadgets’ that move an arbitrary qubit to a location,
depending on whether m = 0 or m = 1. By doubling the construction as seen
before, it is easy to turn these into a gadget which applies an inverse phase gate
whenever m = 1. Note that we could just apply Theorem 7 in order to construct
a gadget directly from a log-space Turing machine of the decryption function. In
this example, however, we choose to exhibit a more efficient gadget that exploits
the structure of the BV11 scheme.
We follow [BV11, Section 4.5] in rewriting Equation 3 in terms of binary
arithmetic. Let s[i](j) denote the jth bit of the ith entry of s, then the inner
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product can be written as
w − 〈v, s〉 (mod p) = w −
k∑
i=1
v[i]s[i] (mod p)
= w −
k∑
i=1
log p∑
j=0
v[i](j) · 2j · s[i] (mod p) (4)
Let a permutation gadget be a subgadget of size 2p, parametrized by a number
q ∈ Zp. Label the first p qubits by 0in to (p − 1)in, and the second p qubits
by 0out to (p − 1)out. The gadget simply creates EPR pairs between xin and
(x+ q (mod p))out, for all x ∈ Zp. Such a gadget can effectively simulate addition
with q over Zp.
For each element of the vector s we will create log p permutation gadgets.
The intuition behind the construction is as follows: The inner product which
computed the decryption of the ciphertext is written as a sum of κ log p numbers,
that either contribute to the sum or not, depending on a bit of the ciphertext v.
For each i from 1 to κ, and each j from 0 to log p, we create a permutation
gadget, labeled by (i, j), for the number 2j · s[i].
The evaluator uses this gadget in the following way. He performs a Bell
measurement between the input qubit and the 0in qubit of the first gadget such
that v[i](j) = 1. Then, he connects all output qubits 0out to (p − 1)out of this
gadget to all the input qubits of the next gadget for which v[i](j) = 1.
After teleporting his qubit through all gadgets, the qubit will be exactly at
the location zout of the final gadget the evaluator used, where z =
∑κ
i=1 v[i]s[i]
(mod p). (Although of course the evaluator has no way of knowing which of the
p locations this is.) He can then, by simple permutation, apply an inverse phase
gate whenever w − z (mod 2) = 1.
Finally, as in the construction from the previous section, we double the entire
construction to route the unknown qubit back to a known location. The size of
the total gadget is then bounded by 4κp log p.
Large modulus. In case the modulus p is superpolynomially large, constructing
the gadget explicitly appears to be much harder, and a log-space algorithm for
this inner product is not immediately obvious. For completeness, we sketch a
proof strategy to reiterate that such a polynomial-sized gadget does still exist in
this case.
The decryption function of Equation 3 has depth O(log κ+ log log p), see for
example [BV11, Lemma 4.5]. This can be proven by writing the decomposition
of Equation 4 as a Wallace tree.
Given a low-depth circuit, we could now apply Theorem 5 to convert this
circuit into a garden-hose protocol. In contrast to the small-modulus case, we do
not exploit the structure of the decryption function to construct a more efficient
gadget.
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E Constructing gadgets using swap and Paulis
In the current description of the gadget generation, the key generator has to be
able to perform a variety of tasks: he has to generate EPR-pairs, as well as perform
P† gates and Bell measurements. We show in this section how the gadgets can be
generated securely using only X, Z and CNOT, when the key generator is given
resources by some computationally more powerful (but potentially malicious)
party, for example the evaluator.
As described in Section 3.1, we see from Figure 7 that the gadget Γpk ′(sk)
is effectively a list of 2m EPR-pairs (some of which have an extra (P† ⊗ I)
transformation on them), with the qubits ordered in some way that depends on
sk . If the key generator is supplied with a list of 2m EPR-pairs |Φ+〉 and as many
pairs (I ⊗P†)|Φ+〉, it is clear that he can create the gadget by swapping some of
the qubits (using CNOT gates), and applying random Pauli operations (using X
and Z gates) on every pair. Any unused pairs are discarded.
If the supplier of these pairs follows the protocol and sends actual EPR-pairs to
the key generator, this tactic suffices to hide all information about sk . However,
if the supplier acts maliciously, he may send two qubits to the key generator
claiming that they form an EPR-pair, while in reality he is keeping some form of
entanglement with one or both of the qubits. We need to make sure that even in
this case, where the supplier actively tries to gather information about sk , this
information is still secure.
The key generator, upon receiving the (real or fake) EPR-pairs, can apply
independently selected random Pauli transformations on every qubit. If the
qubits really formed EPR-pairs, it would suffice to apply a random Pauli to only
one of the two qubits in the pair, but by applying this transformation to both
qubits, any entanglement that a malicious supplier might hold with any of them
becomes completely useless. Since any swap of two qubits consists of three CNOT
gates that commute with the Pauli’s, the state after swapping the qubits into
the correct order is still completely mixed. Hence, no information about sk is
revealed to the supplier.
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